Try Hack Me: Friday Overtime Complete Write-up 👾

christine - Jul 26 - - Dev Community

In my most recent side-quest in life, I decided to dive back into the world of hAcK1_nG. The last time I was dabbling in the art of Cybersecurity, I focused more on red-teaming, but this time my interest is peaked by the life of a blue-teamer.

That’s right, I’m joining The Defenders (trademark coming soon). But before I do that, let’s have a look at completing the Friday Overtime room.

GIF

So in this scenario, we are the only remaining CTI Analyst working overtime at PandaProbe Intelligence. We need to investigate potential file attachment breaches that are suspected to contain malware samples.

Let’s start by running our machine. This might take a few minutes, so wait until your machine IP is populated.

Friday Overtime

After your machine is up and running, let’s start answering our questions.

1. Who shared the malware samples?

On the machine, open up Chromium and navigate to your given IP Address. At the top of the CentOS screen is an option to “Log in — DocIntel”. Click on it and log in with the given credentials.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

From there on you will be greeted by your email, which contains the information on the breach as well as the document containing the files, and the password to the document.

Friday Overtime

If you scroll down, you will see the name of the person who shared the malware sample files.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

2. What is the SHA1 hash of the file “pRsm.dll” inside samples.zip?

To find this out, we will need to first download the actual attachment and extract the files from it. Click on the attachment on the right to download the file called “sample.zip”.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Now, you can either extract this zipped folder in the Command Line, or just by right-clicking it and extracting it manually. Remember, the password to this file is Panda321!, so enter that when prompted.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Let’s open up our Terminal so that we can read the SHA1 hash of the file “pRsm.dll”.

Friday Overtime

To read the hash of our file, we will make use of sha1sum. SHA1sum is a utility that computes and verifies SHA-1 cryptographic hash values. The primary reason you can use SHA1sum to read the hash of our .dll file — or any file, for that matter — is due to its ability to process binary data and generate a fixed-size hash value, which is a representation of the file’s content. 

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

3. Which malware framework utilizes these DLLs as add-on modules?

For this question, I turned to good old Google to see if I could find any information on “pRsm.dll” and the framework used.

Friday Overtime

I saw it flagged in this article, so I clicked on it and searched for “framework”. Without too much effort, you can find the answer in the second paragraph of the article.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

4. Which MITRE ATT&CK Technique is linked to using pRsm.dll in this malware framework?

For this, we need to search “pRsm.dll” and look out for a Technique ID (TXXXX), since we see that the answer required has 5 characters.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

5. What is the CyberChef defanged URL of the malicious download location first seen on 2020–11–02?

Now we need to find a URL connected to 2020–11–02, and defang it on CyberChef. Defanging URLs and IPs is a critical practice for safely sharing potentially harmful links, and CyberChef simplifies this process, especially when handling large volumes of data. This practice is essential when sharing resources that might contain harmful data.

Let’s head back to our article, and search for our date “2020–11–02”. We can see that it lands on a result that has a URL attached to it.

Friday Overtime

Copy and paste this URL into the CyberChef input, and add the recipe “Defang URL”. The output will give you your answer.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

6. What is the CyberChef defanged IP address of the C&C server first detected on 2020–09–14 using these modules?

For this, we also need to search our date on the article we sourced previously. The IP should correlate to the date first seen on “2020–09–14”.

Friday Overtime

Let’s copy this IP into the CyberChef input (remove the brackets because it should be pure data). Change the recipe to “Defang IP”. The result should be your answer.

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

7. What is the SHA1 hash of the spyagent family spyware hosted on the same IP targeting Android devices on November 16, 2022?

Unfortunately, we cannot find the SHA1 hash of the malware on the article that we’ve been using. But, luckily for us, we can make use of a service that analyzes files and URLs for viruses, worms, trojans, and other kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus engines and website scanners. 

Can you think of a service that can do all of the above? Well, we can use VirusTotal. VirusTotal will allow us to search for the malware connected to the IP address, and analyze all of its characteristics. So let’s open up the site and search for any data connected to our “fanged” IP address.

Friday Overtime

Click on the “Relations” panel to see where this IP has been flagged. This panel helps us explore the relationships between various indicators of compromise (IoCs) such as files, URLs, domains, and IP addresses.

You will see that an IoC from this IP was picked up on Android on the date of 2022–11–16. This is the name of our spyagent family spyware.

Friday Overtime

Now all we need is the hash value of this spyagent. Copy the name and search it. If we click on the “Details” of our result, we will see that there is a SHA1 hash value, which is what we need for our final flag!

Friday Overtime

Friday Overtime

Conclusion

Congratulations on completing the room. I hope you found the writeup valuable, and that you could follow along with ease.

Now, onwards to the next room! 😊


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